Posted by: JPEG April 24, 2009
The Future of Nepal Army
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Yes we need to be honest with ourselves. We no longer can afford to
deny the injustice being done to the majority of Nepalese. If we are
honest and not afraid to speak it out, we can fully eradicate the
problem of RACISM the sooner.

Here's a articles which prove injustice that has been going on since the founding of Nepal by PNS.



    In the name of fighting terror, the Royal Nepalese Army has
relentlessly unleashed terror on unarmed civilians using rapes,
disappearances, mass murders and torture. However, the army has escaped
public attention.

The April uprising delivered a legally defunct Parliament back to
power. This Parliament had to set about undoing most of the royal
excesses of the past. The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) had played a
crucial role in consolidating the king’s coup in February 2005 and in
retaining it until April 2006. Hence, democratizing this institution
and bringing it in line with the aspirations of the people would
register stiff resistance from the upper echelon in the army.

The Nepal army had played a crucial role in the colonization process
embarked upon by the small Gorkha kingdom in the 18th century.
Mainstream history books record the process as ‘unification’ of the
smaller principalities of Nepal. The terrain, the complex society, the
economy and political structures of the varied little kingdoms that
were subdued were not an obstacle to the marching Nepalese army. The
first ruler of what is modern Nepal, Prithvi Narayan Shah, envisaged
the State as resting on two pillars: a satisfied peasantry and a loyal
army.

The military is a crucial component of security for any modern
nation-state which has perceived threats that are both external and
internal. In Nepal’s case, basically, the military has historically
been engaged with quelling internal threats to the notion of the
unified Hindu kingdom. The Nepal army itself traces its own roots to
the conquest and subsequent unification of modern-day Nepal by Prithvi
Narayan Shah, the tenth direct ancestor of the present incumbent,
Gyanendra, in the mid-18th century. Historically, then, the army’s
loyalty is forged to the monarch. It is rooted in a feudal and colonial
history whose only role in history has been to repress the people.

This was the state until 1990. After the people’s movement (Jan
Andolan), Nepal witnessed multiparty democracy and constitutional
monarchy. Theoretically, the 1990 Constitution transferred the
country’s sovereignty to its people. However, in real terms, nothing
changed. ‘Democracy’ could not force a change in the army’s high
command. The top position of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) remained
with only four clans. For close to 200 years, among the 37 chiefs of staff, 26 came from the Rana family and the remaining 11 from the Thapa, Shah and Basnet clans.
The majority of officer corps in the higher echelon has historically
hailed from the powerful Khas-Thakuri caste close to the royal family.
Proximity to the royal family was nurtured by matrimonial ties between
the Ranas and the Shahs, and their offspring’s marriages to other
high-caste Hindus of the traditional courtier higher classes. The top
military brass, getting its education and training abroad, remains an
integral part of the royalist club.

With such privileges passed on through inheritance, what is the incentive for this ‘Club of Five’ families
to move with the times? During training, new recruits are indoctrinated
to take pride in the role the RNA has played in the creation and
consolidation of the Nepali State and sees itself as the ultimate
defender of the kingdom. Armies have to be conformist. Reinforcing this
belief becomes easy in the army training institutions, especially with
cadets who have been socialized into these ideas even before they enter
the portals of the institutions. Knowing no other reality, they accept
the reality they were born into. Indeed, in this world there is only
contempt for politicians, the vast sections of the urban and rural
poor, the labouring classes and other unwashed elements of the society.

Feudalism was reinforced by the ruler Mahendra, who, during the
Panchayat period, was particularly solicitous of the welfare of the
officers and other ranks. He issued royal grants of land and other
privileges to create personal bonds between himself and key officers.
Therefore, multiparty democracy as an interlude was irritating to the
top brass. Former Chief of Staff, Prajwalla Shumsher Rana, put forward
his best arguments at the passing-out parade of officers at the Army
Staff College on March 28, 2002, “Who is responsible for the present
state of the country?... Was it malgovernance (kushasan) of the
political parties or was it the army? How just is it to burden the army
with this difficult situation created by political reasons?”

The pretext of people’s war by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
was rewarding for the RNA. A flush of arms poured in from India, the US
and UK. Arms were also being purchased from other countries, including
Israel. The army’s budget was going up, and its ranks were swelling.
And yet, the irritant of multiparty democracy, at least in form,
remained simmering and alive.

This nagging irritation was removed by the royal proclamation of
February 1, 2005. Gyanendra went on to announce that the RNA was free
to run industries, set up companies, and launch projects in partnership
with national or multinational companies. They could even set up mobile
FM radio stations. Military power had to be reinforced with commercial
profit.



The military has historically been engaged with quelling internal
threats to the unified Hindu kingdom. Its loyalty is forged to the
monarch. It is rooted in a feudal history whose only role has been to
repress the people



However, the people’s massive movement, surging beneath the surface,
rose to a crescendo in April 2006. A step back was necessary.
Consequently, the name of the army was changed to NA. The military
secretariat was put under Parliament. Other changes were effected.
However, in its essence, the army remains the same in character and
structure. It is unrepresentative of the population. The feudal
structure is entrenched with the Khas-Thakuri generals who are not willing to include the indigenous people of the Terai or the dalits.
Women were included, but in auxiliary services, and that too very few.
The disparity between the privileges of officers and other ranks is too
sharp to be ignored.

In the contemporary politicized milieu of Nepal, there have been
incidents of desertion and mutiny, which are not highlighted. The army
recruits at the bottom are the same impoverished peasants and workers
oppressed by the feudal Nepali State. Surely, the NA cannot afford to
retain its present hierarchy, domination and conservatism in a peaceful
democracy that is envisaged for Nepal by its people. It has to take
into cognizance the social and cultural changes sweeping Nepal through
transformations in consciousness brought by the Maoists, dalits,
janajati, women, Madheshis and other indigenous and autonomous people’s
movements.

The NA has always had a fractious relationship with elected the
governments. GP Koirala has headed the government five times since 1991
and has always kept the defense portfolio with himself. The
relationship between the minister and the army high command always
lacked mutual confidence. The army, with the implicit support of the
palace, was reluctant to strengthen the civilian government’s position
during the entire pre-2005 period.

The intentional denial to engage militarily with the Maoists at Dunai,
district headquarters of Dailekh, on September 29, 2000, despite the
Nepalese army having been dispatched by the then Prime Minister GP
Koirala for that purpose, was part of the long term policy of the
palace. The subsequent Rolpa episode led to the resignation of Koirala
as prime minister of the elected government, who questioned the loyalty
of the RNA and criticised its disregard of the civilian government.

The fact remains that after 1990, no single defence minister has been
able to take up the issue of even cosmetic changes in the RNA, which
grew from 43,000 to 90,000 in a short time after November 2001, in the
name of curbing insurgency. In the intervening period, the US military
specialist team that visited Nepal in mid-2002 had suggested an
expansion of the force by another 78,000 which would have pushed the
number to 200,000: an army of three corps, six mountain divisions and
four plains divisions.

It should also be recalled that during the last two phases of ceasefire
between the government and Maoist rebels, it was the RNA that sabotaged
peace talks. In August 2003, the provocative killing of unarmed
activists by the RNA in Doramba on the very day of the beginning of the
peace talks was acknowledged by even the status quo defenders as
unpalatable and indefensible. During the civil war, their conduct was
always questioned by national and international forums. In the name of
fighting terror, they were relentlessly unleashing terror on unarmed
civilians using rapes, disappearances, mass murders, torture and
intimidation.

When the Maoists declared ceasefire in the run-up to the April
movement, the RNA did not spare aerial attacks on mass meetings and
other provocations. After April 2006, the chiefs of all security
services were hauled up for their role in the repression of the people
in the previous years of autocracy and absolutism — all but for the
army chief. Under the system of unified command, which was then in
force, the army chief was at the top of the pyramid with all other
chiefs reporting to him. Hence, there has to be a system of
accountability when it comes to serious allegations of sustained, mass
atrocities committed against the people. Civilian rule, as is now
prevailing in Nepal, in whatever shape it may be, is also about
professionalizing the army, not just about democracy and the rule of
law. The NA needs to be transformed
from a monopolist, royalist force for State violence operating in
defence of feudal privileges and brought in line as a national army
serving the people and defending their interests.


In Nepal’s historical context, how this will be done, as yet, remains a
mystery. Especially because structurally the military elite is wedded
to the traditional institution of monarchy. The international community
and Nepal’s privileged classes are raising concerns about the Maoist
army, militia and arms. However, the NA has escaped public attention.
With a ceasefire in place between the new government and the rebels,
and with talks on, there is a serious possibility of lasting peace in
Nepal through a politically-negotiated settlement that also includes
the future of the two armies and their arms.

Indeed, even the recent conduct of the army personnel is not assuring.

Kantipuronline reported on July 30, 2006, of an incident involving
three dozen armed soldiers and others led by a dismissed captain of the
NA Bhairavnath Battalion who seized the Kathmandu Durbar Marg Ward
Police Office, forcibly took away three police personnel and subjected
them to severe torture.

Incidents such as this raise questions about discipline and war-lordism
among the NA, and need to be factored during the monitoring of the
peace process. Only then can we hope for a democratic republic of Nepal.



The writer is a Phd scholar in JNU, New Delhi
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