Yes we need to be honest with ourselves. We no longer can afford to deny the injustice being done to the majority of Nepalese. If we are honest and not afraid to speak it out, we can fully eradicate the problem of RACISM the sooner.
Here's a articles which prove injustice that has been going on since the founding of Nepal by PNS.

In the name of fighting terror, the Royal Nepalese Army has relentlessly unleashed terror on unarmed civilians using rapes, disappearances, mass murders and torture. However, the army has escaped public attention.
The April uprising delivered a legally defunct Parliament back to power. This Parliament had to set about undoing most of the royal excesses of the past. The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) had played a crucial role in consolidating the king’s coup in February 2005 and in retaining it until April 2006. Hence, democratizing this institution and bringing it in line with the aspirations of the people would register stiff resistance from the upper echelon in the army.
The Nepal army had played a crucial role in the colonization process embarked upon by the small Gorkha kingdom in the 18th century. Mainstream history books record the process as ‘unification’ of the smaller principalities of Nepal. The terrain, the complex society, the economy and political structures of the varied little kingdoms that were subdued were not an obstacle to the marching Nepalese army. The first ruler of what is modern Nepal, Prithvi Narayan Shah, envisaged the State as resting on two pillars: a satisfied peasantry and a loyal army.
The military is a crucial component of security for any modern nation-state which has perceived threats that are both external and internal. In Nepal’s case, basically, the military has historically been engaged with quelling internal threats to the notion of the unified Hindu kingdom. The Nepal army itself traces its own roots to the conquest and subsequent unification of modern-day Nepal by Prithvi Narayan Shah, the tenth direct ancestor of the present incumbent, Gyanendra, in the mid-18th century. Historically, then, the army’s loyalty is forged to the monarch. It is rooted in a feudal and colonial history whose only role in history has been to repress the people.

This was the state until 1990. After the people’s movement (Jan Andolan), Nepal witnessed multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. Theoretically, the 1990 Constitution transferred the country’s sovereignty to its people. However, in real terms, nothing changed. ‘Democracy’ could not force a change in the army’s high command. The top position of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) remained with only four clans. For close to 200 years, among the 37 chiefs of staff, 26 came from the Rana family and the remaining 11 from the Thapa, Shah and Basnet clans. The majority of officer corps in the higher echelon has historically hailed from the powerful Khas-Thakuri caste close to the royal family. Proximity to the royal family was nurtured by matrimonial ties between the Ranas and the Shahs, and their offspring’s marriages to other high-caste Hindus of the traditional courtier higher classes. The top military brass, getting its education and training abroad, remains an integral part of the royalist club. With such privileges passed on through inheritance, what is the incentive for this ‘Club of Five’ families to move with the times? During training, new recruits are indoctrinated to take pride in the role the RNA has played in the creation and consolidation of the Nepali State and sees itself as the ultimate defender of the kingdom. Armies have to be conformist. Reinforcing this belief becomes easy in the army training institutions, especially with cadets who have been socialized into these ideas even before they enter the portals of the institutions. Knowing no other reality, they accept the reality they were born into. Indeed, in this world there is only contempt for politicians, the vast sections of the urban and rural poor, the labouring classes and other unwashed elements of the society.

Feudalism was reinforced by the ruler Mahendra, who, during the Panchayat period, was particularly solicitous of the welfare of the officers and other ranks. He issued royal grants of land and other privileges to create personal bonds between himself and key officers. Therefore, multiparty democracy as an interlude was irritating to the top brass. Former Chief of Staff, Prajwalla Shumsher Rana, put forward his best arguments at the passing-out parade of officers at the Army Staff College on March 28, 2002, “Who is responsible for the present state of the country?... Was it malgovernance (kushasan) of the political parties or was it the army? How just is it to burden the army with this difficult situation created by political reasons?”
The pretext of people’s war by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was rewarding for the RNA. A flush of arms poured in from India, the US and UK. Arms were also being purchased from other countries, including Israel. The army’s budget was going up, and its ranks were swelling. And yet, the irritant of multiparty democracy, at least in form, remained simmering and alive.
This nagging irritation was removed by the royal proclamation of February 1, 2005. Gyanendra went on to announce that the RNA was free to run industries, set up companies, and launch projects in partnership with national or multinational companies. They could even set up mobile FM radio stations. Military power had to be reinforced with commercial profit.

The military has historically been engaged with quelling internal threats to the unified Hindu kingdom. Its loyalty is forged to the monarch. It is rooted in a feudal history whose only role has been to repress the people

However, the people’s massive movement, surging beneath the surface, rose to a crescendo in April 2006. A step back was necessary. Consequently, the name of the army was changed to NA. The military secretariat was put under Parliament. Other changes were effected. However, in its essence, the army remains the same in character and structure. It is unrepresentative of the population. The feudal structure is entrenched with the Khas-Thakuri generals who are not willing to include the indigenous people of the Terai or the dalits. Women were included, but in auxiliary services, and that too very few. The disparity between the privileges of officers and other ranks is too sharp to be ignored.
In the contemporary politicized milieu of Nepal, there have been incidents of desertion and mutiny, which are not highlighted. The army recruits at the bottom are the same impoverished peasants and workers oppressed by the feudal Nepali State. Surely, the NA cannot afford to retain its present hierarchy, domination and conservatism in a peaceful democracy that is envisaged for Nepal by its people. It has to take into cognizance the social and cultural changes sweeping Nepal through transformations in consciousness brought by the Maoists, dalits, janajati, women, Madheshis and other indigenous and autonomous people’s movements.
The NA has always had a fractious relationship with elected the governments. GP Koirala has headed the government five times since 1991 and has always kept the defense portfolio with himself. The relationship between the minister and the army high command always lacked mutual confidence. The army, with the implicit support of the palace, was reluctant to strengthen the civilian government’s position during the entire pre-2005 period.
The intentional denial to engage militarily with the Maoists at Dunai, district headquarters of Dailekh, on September 29, 2000, despite the Nepalese army having been dispatched by the then Prime Minister GP Koirala for that purpose, was part of the long term policy of the palace. The subsequent Rolpa episode led to the resignation of Koirala as prime minister of the elected government, who questioned the loyalty of the RNA and criticised its disregard of the civilian government.
The fact remains that after 1990, no single defence minister has been able to take up the issue of even cosmetic changes in the RNA, which grew from 43,000 to 90,000 in a short time after November 2001, in the name of curbing insurgency. In the intervening period, the US military specialist team that visited Nepal in mid-2002 had suggested an expansion of the force by another 78,000 which would have pushed the number to 200,000: an army of three corps, six mountain divisions and four plains divisions.
It should also be recalled that during the last two phases of ceasefire between the government and Maoist rebels, it was the RNA that sabotaged peace talks. In August 2003, the provocative killing of unarmed activists by the RNA in Doramba on the very day of the beginning of the peace talks was acknowledged by even the status quo defenders as unpalatable and indefensible. During the civil war, their conduct was always questioned by national and international forums. In the name of fighting terror, they were relentlessly unleashing terror on unarmed civilians using rapes, disappearances, mass murders, torture and intimidation.
When the Maoists declared ceasefire in the run-up to the April movement, the RNA did not spare aerial attacks on mass meetings and other provocations. After April 2006, the chiefs of all security services were hauled up for their role in the repression of the people in the previous years of autocracy and absolutism — all but for the army chief. Under the system of unified command, which was then in force, the army chief was at the top of the pyramid with all other chiefs reporting to him. Hence, there has to be a system of accountability when it comes to serious allegations of sustained, mass atrocities committed against the people. Civilian rule, as is now prevailing in Nepal, in whatever shape it may be, is also about professionalizing the army, not just about democracy and the rule of law. The NA needs to be transformed from a monopolist, royalist force for State violence operating in defence of feudal privileges and brought in line as a national army serving the people and defending their interests.
In Nepal’s historical context, how this will be done, as yet, remains a mystery. Especially because structurally the military elite is wedded to the traditional institution of monarchy. The international community and Nepal’s privileged classes are raising concerns about the Maoist army, militia and arms. However, the NA has escaped public attention. With a ceasefire in place between the new government and the rebels, and with talks on, there is a serious possibility of lasting peace in Nepal through a politically-negotiated settlement that also includes the future of the two armies and their arms.
Indeed, even the recent conduct of the army personnel is not assuring.
Kantipuronline reported on July 30, 2006, of an incident involving three dozen armed soldiers and others led by a dismissed captain of the NA Bhairavnath Battalion who seized the Kathmandu Durbar Marg Ward Police Office, forcibly took away three police personnel and subjected them to severe torture.
Incidents such as this raise questions about discipline and war-lordism among the NA, and need to be factored during the monitoring of the peace process. Only then can we hope for a democratic republic of Nepal.

The writer is a Phd scholar in JNU, New Delhi