From the Economist North Korea blasts away hopes of engagement Oct 9th 2006 | TOKYO From Economist.com The isolated state comes of age as a nuclear power, but the consequences could be all negative for Kim Jong Il FOLLOWING through on a promise it made in the United Nations only last week, North Korea exploded a nuclear device on Monday October 9th deep under a mountain in north-eastern Hamgyong province. The regime of Kim Jong Il immediately declared that its nuclear test would serve to defend “the peace and stability on the Korean pensinsula and in the area around it.” On the contrary, the provocation has brought international condemnation and destabilised regional security, even raising the prospect of an arms race in which neighbours such as Japan and South Korea may consider developing nuclear weapons of their own. In the near term, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are more likely to pose a greater risk to North Koreans than to the neighbours. The country is reckoned to have reprocessed enough weapons-grade plutonium to make several bombs (it has also admitted to a programme for enriching uranium). The bombs, however, are fairly crude—in the underground test, the nuclear reaction was probably triggered by a large conventional charge. Such a bomb, in other words, is not easily transportable; North Korea is still some way from being able to miniaturise nuclear weapons to use on missiles or even to drop from planes. Unusual means of delivery, such as a shipping container, would be needed if North Korea’s were to be used in anger. So the immediate threats from North Korea’s new capability come from radioactive leaks into the atmosphere and North Korea’s groundwater. Yet an early international consequence of the test is likely to be the swift burial of the so-called six-party talks, involving China, South Korea, Japan, America and Russia. These talks, which have staggered on for ages, were meant to forestall North Korea going nuclear, dangling aid and security guarantees before Mr Kim’s ghastly regime in return for a verifiable dismantling of his nuclear programmes. However, the multilateral diplomacy that this forum offered never worked. China, not wanting North Korean problems to spill over the Chinese border, and South Korea, wedded to engagement at almost any cost, feared that putting pressure on North Korea would lead to instability. Meanwhile, the administration of President George Bush, though occasionally sounding tough, allowed the six-party talks to drift, its mind on challenges elsewhere, notably Iraq. Most of all, Mr Kim himself, though blaming America for tensions, had no intention of giving up his nuclear programmes. Here, Mr Kim, feeling the pinch of financial sanctions and dissatisfied with the region he sees outside his brutalised country—a region that is prosperous, capitalist and policed by American might—may have miscalculated. Rather than increasing North Korea’s advantage, its new nuclear capability may unite opposition. China, already angry at North Korea’s missile tests in July (in an unprecedented step, it signed on to a UN resolution condemning North Korea and imposing limited sanctions), lambasted its nuclear test. South Korea’s “sunshine policy” towards the north now seems very hard to sustain—on October 9th the government halted a shipment of food and put troops on high alert. Meanwhile, North Korea’s provocations have made it much easier for Japan’s new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, to bury longstanding differences on summit trips to Beijing and Seoul on October 8th and 9th. Neighbours now have a common desire to stop the potential instability—economic as well as military—that a nuclear North Korea might bring. The action will now move to the UN Security Council. Australia has already said it will advocate tougher UN sanctions against North Korea, blocking North Korean funds and limiting the ability of North Koreans to travel. America will certainly push for the tougher policing of ships and planes that might be carrying weapons technology. More efforts will be made to go after Mr Kim’s own business empire, known as Division 39, that is crucial to the dictator for keeping the North Korean regime sweet. Countries with diplomatic relations may withdraw ambassadors. Already, the international attitude towards Mr Kim is turning from half-hearted engagement to what is already being called “malign neglect”.