Status of the Security Forces In this situation, what is both puzzling and counterproductive is how little realistic consideration has emerged concerning the future of the security forces, of which the RNA is the dominant element. This is puzzling, because the security forces are quite intact and – contrary to yet another theme pushed by both activist elements of the new regime and their international activist backers – exercised remarkable restraint during the recent upheaval. Lathi charges are not semiautomatic volleys, and the latter did not occur. It is counterproductive for the same reasons: there are at least 150,000 armed government security forces in completely intact units. It is naïve to assume that they – and their compatriots in the other two forces, the Armed Police Force, or APF, and the Civil Police, or CP – are going to march off to oblivion, surrender, or slaughter. The latter two, to be clear, are the Maoist position, and they expect to extract such from the ruling SPA as the Maoist price of “nonviolent participation” in the state. To judge that this inevitably will lead to confrontation requires no analytical acumen, simply looking at the Nepali security forces with clear eyes. What is now on the field is a force quite different from that, which entered the conflict in November 2001, when RNA was attacked by the Maoists. This is especially so in the key middle grades of RNA and extending even to the younger brigadiers. It is also true in APF, perhaps to a lesser extent in NP. It is RNA, which is of particular interest. RNA’s “field elements” accept parliamentary supremacy and seek a more professional, “21st Century military.” Critical in this respect is a functioning Ministry of Defence. Frequently (e.g., as in Sri Lanka), the Prime Minister will also be the Minister of Defence, with a Deputy Minister actually handling the day-to-day business of running the armed forces. This is a level of detail that does not concern RNA now. Officers know there are numerous friendly states with extensive experience in implementing and consolidating the proper mechanisms. Many of these younger RNA officers have even considered the passing of the monarchy, but they are worldly enough to see that this leaves open the question of what institution or figure would serve the referee's position (e.g., India has a president; many former Commonwealth states have a Governor General; the US has its Senate; Britain, the House of Lords). Hence, they believe it is preferable that a constitutional monarchy remain. What they do not accept is the position demanded by the Maoists and their left wing allies: "replacing" one force by another, or of "purging" one force only to install the cadres of another. Reconciliation, to their mind, demands amalgamation, even if this is accompanied by reduction in overall numbers. For their part, APF and CP are critical to the normal functioning of the state. Under no circumstances will any force accept being disbanded in favor of Maoist replacements. To do so would guarantee left-wing dictatorship. Operational Matters Ironically, whatever the precise manner in which events unfold, the sitting government is bound to find, in the months ahead, normal policing and security duties will assume heightened importance. A clear understanding must be worked out by the government as to what is expected to arrest a dangerous societal drift that has set in. Armed thugs, often claiming to be representing “the people” but invariably cadres of Maoist front organizations, roam all major population centers in Nepal and must be brought within the normal rule of law. This is a job particularly of the police, supported by the APF, but it is inevitable that RNA will be involved. The present situation, to include the widespread threatening of individuals and institutions, cannot go unchecked. Within the forces themselves, leave and training will assume heightened importance during the transition. The latter must be done in a way so as to maintain unit integrity and readiness but not be confrontational. Best way to do this is to integrate representatives of the local civil authority into coordinating bodies. Politically, RNA is confronted with a Faustian bargain: It must serve the state even with the knowledge that the unity of SPAM (Seven Party Alliance + the Maoists) depends upon the SPA placating the M. The Maoists see the victory as theirs and see themselves as dictating the terms of surrender -- and see only trials for those who have resisted them. Hence, the security forces must keep order even as they are plotted against (in certain circles) and held up as a bargaining chip (in other circles). Their logical advocates, the Indians, who have the most to lose from a Maoist-dominated Nepal, remain, as noted above, very much an unknown element, given the array of actors waging mini-foreign policies. One factor has not changed as any perusal of large segments of the Indian press reveals: New Delhi has been ill-informed by a good fraction of its so-called “Nepal experts,” in just the manner it was led astray, two decades ago, by its “Sri Lanka experts.” It cannot be said that Indian analysts have developed much actual knowledge of the workings of Nepali Maoism. The dominant position is that the CPN(M) can be bought off or simply directed – an astonishing position given what India seems to have realized quite belatedly about the Stalinist, anti-democratic essence of its own Maoists. CPI(M), in particular, has little understanding of Nepali insurgent ground realities. The Indian left-wing political pilgrims to Nepal deal with their opposite numbers in the UML. If they meet a “Maoist,” they deal with personalities of their “own stratum," who can be as engaging and sophisticated as any. They do not deal with what is in the hills, thus gaining no comprehension that there is an organization of LTTE clones, every bit as dogmatic and ruthless. For those who have dealt with the Tamil insurgents, one conclusion is salient: orientation of manpower is never the issue in a situation such as this. It is leaders who are the lynchpin. It is insurgent leaders who have produced the endless cycle of insurgent brutality in Sri Lanka, a struggle that has long since seen its original causes vanish. The situation is quite similar in Nepal. It is the Maoist leaders who are following an ideological play-book. Their followers are thrown up by local grievances. Maoist manpower is just as eager for "peace" as anyone else, but they expect to get something out of their campaign. They have been told consistently that the new order will belong to them and will bring justice and prosperity. There is no way to do that in the short term except by taking from the old and giving to the new. That this is playing a losing hand has been made clear in study after study, most recently by the simple calculations of Dr Steve Gorzula. As he notes, divide the arable land of Nepal (22,627 km2) by the population (28 million in July 2006 estimates), and the result is a society that has exceeded the carrying capacity of the land. Lip-serve is paid to the only real possibility, development of hydropower, and the result is a vacuum into which Maoist coercive utopian solutions have no competitors. What is to be Done? Certainly Lenin, who set forth the query in his famous work, would be proud of his Maoist pupils. On the side of democracy, there is little worthy of praise. The stormy course ahead, though, will require more steady seamanship than has hitherto been demonstrated in the short history of Nepali democracy. More than “hope (it all works out)” will be required. The role of the security forces will be paramount, for they are the only guarantee that Maoist violence will not be the trump card. Thus normal functioning of those security forces must be maintained at all costs, so as to avoid demoralization and possible desertion. Clear explanations of what is happening are imperative, with the emphasis upon "transition to parliamentary supremacy." Any impression of "defeat" must be banished, despite the concerted efforts of the left-wing to push this claim to front position in the ongoing struggle for control of the narrative describing recent events. Already, the Maoists claim their revolutionary forces were key (with their cadres inciting violence and caching explosives in urban areas). Of course, it was not the revolutionary project that emerged victorious, but the demand for participation and results. "Reform," then, must be the order of the day, as has long been called for by all interested parties. "Reform" is not a word in the Maoist vocabulary, so forces of actual democracy (as opposed to “people’s democracy”) will be called upon to face the inevitable backlash. It is for the politicians to deal with this reality, but the security forces will be their shield. It is possible that international mediation and even involvement may create new possibilities. For the moment, however, the Maoists have no intention of participating in a "new" version of the old-order. They are demanding and expecting that a constitutional convention will deliver a people's republic in form if not in immediate practice. They are determined to exact vengeance. They are not, in other words, seeking "democracy" as we know the word. There is a strong thread of thought which claims the Maoists will choose the path trod by the "other" insurgent groups in Sri Lanka (e.g., PLOT, TELO, EPRLF), groups that agreed, with certain misgivings, to work within the system. More likely, is that the Maoists will go the way of LTTE, which moved after each hopeful pause to resume its revolutionary project. It hardly needs highlighting that such a course of action by the Maoists would put them squarely at odds with the desires of the Nepali masses – just as LTTE cannot today be said to represent much more than the aspirations of its rump state. If the CPN(M) is astute, it will realize this. Unfortunately, historically does not provide grounds for optimism. There is no Maoist insurgency that has displayed such foresight. Neither do operational realities provide any more hope: the Maoists are not in any way standing down. The up side? If the Maoists move as driven by their hate-filled ideology and resume their struggle. they will find themselves just where LTTE does – on the wrong side of history and facing a reasonably united, democratic society, amply assisted by friendly powers -- to include India. http://www.losangeleschronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=9146