I don't believe that the Maoists have any grand strategy as such. Their strategy is to EXPLOIT everything and everybody to their advantage at all times. A theory (But first, this: The benefit of posting this on an OPEN site like this is that this will hopefully invite agreements, disagreements, modifications, objecttions, criticisms and all that -- all of which -- as I have ALWAYS maintained -- add up to hallmarks of a democratic exercise. I am NOT someone who likes to preach to the choir, and get easy wah-wah's . . . the challenge is NOT to be dogmatic, but to keep an open-mind about what appears to explain what is happening) OK, then: The Maoists have NOT directly touched upon a critical mass of Nepal's middle- to upper-middle citizens, both ideologically and politically. These non-poor (earning, let's say, a family income of over 3000 USD per YEAR: that's roughly 210,000 rupees per year) people have 'outward orientation' in that they want to leave the country, and not stay behind. Yes, because of the Maoist-led Bandhas, their vegetable-supplies were affected; some could not go back for a visit to their ancestral villages; some could not work on Bandha days, and so forth. By and large, in terms of death-numbers, these groups have NOT paid DIRECT prices . . . they have simply bore some inconveniences. That is why, the death of almost 15,000 Nepalis does NOT really register all that much of a shock in any part of Kathmandu. It simply brings a sense of "hasn't-happened-this-to-my-family" sort of a far-away resignation. How many Sajha posters, for instance, have had their immediate family members killed by the Maoists? Hardly any, I would think. In contrast, the Maoists (just as the security forces) have been brutal to the poor, who remain VOICELESS and DEFENCELSS. The Maoists scratch one journalist, and the entire Global Federation of Journalists starts breathing fire, leaving the Maoists no choice but to issue a weak apology. But when the Maoists kill school teachers, there emerges no Nepal Federation of Schoolteachers, let alone a global federation of any sort, to put pressure on the Maoists. This is just an observation. So, based on this observations, a simple identity is this: 1) Poor people = can be crushed by the Maoists. 2) Poor people = can be crushed by the state forces. Result = nothing really happens, except a few halla here and there by human rights people. This has been going on for the last several years. BUT relatively rich people in KTM = left, by and large alone, by the Maoists except to extort money now and then. relatively rich people in KTM = INCREASINGLY hammered by the king's rule (in terms of paying for security costs, fewer opportunities for business, trade and growthetc. The closing of the US visa section, for instance, hurts these groups the most, and they'll lash out at the king for this, among other things. Given these, the way ahead (and I have no idea what's really ahead, so I offer some guesses): 1) The king's short-term strategy, assuming self-preservation, is to pacify the rich, while ignore the poor. That will buy him some time. 2) The parties' short-term strategy, assuming they are after a chance to wield some power, is to negotiate a deal with the king in some manner, maybe with Deuba as the next PM. 3) The Maoists' short-term strategy, assuming they want to wield more influence, is to keep on hurting the poor (that shows that they are alive and well) and keep the parties in a state of agitation. If the state forces themselves do this service (like they appear to be doing), then, all the better. That means, Maoists resources can be saved for now -- while letting a spontaneous fanning of the fights that have erupted erupt between 1) and 2) above. Bottom line? Expect a few years of confusion and uncertainty ahead. As Yogi B famously said, "It ain't over, until it's over" oohi ashu