Here is an interesting analysis of the Party- Maoist understanding: ----------------------------------------------------------------- By PRAKASH CHANDRA LOHANI The concept of "strategic intent" was first introduced by two professors of Management, Gary Hamel and C K Prahalad in a seminal paper written in 1989 while analyzing the competitive behavior of Western and Japanese multinationals. It was argued then that strategic intent as a concept projected an inspiring obsession irrespective of a serious mismatch between resources and ambition. For the leadership, the challenge is to be creative enough to close the gap by building new advantages through a series of tactical moves in different phases. In this process, changing the terms of engagement, competition through collaboration or building new layers of advantages could be some of the flexible means to be employed. Moving from Management to politics is quite a big jump. However, at a conceptual level, the political struggle in Nepal gets its momentum from the strategic intent of the Maoists. It was and still is a projected obsession to create a Maoist state after defeating the rival, the multiparty system of governance with a constitutional monarchy. The strategic intent of the Maoists was an ambition that was in no way adequately supported by the resources they had when they made their move about ten years back. The rival that was in control of the polity, the multi-party system, ignored this threat and failed to respond. The parties in power took it for granted that parliamentary elections provided them with the legitimacy to use (or misuse) power and that it could not be challenged from any quarter. This naïve assumption has been confuted. The Maoists did succeed in challenging the parliamentary system when they successfully managed to thwart the general election in 2002 and consequently to create a constitutional crisis that has grown worse with time. Since then they have shown remarkable flexibility in the use of tactics to achieve their objective. It is they who have been able to define the terms of engagement against the multi-party system. Their terms of engagement have been to dominate the periphery ie the countryside by employing both their ideology and raw terror. Slowly but surely the government has continued to surrender the countryside to the Maoists. In a short period of time after the assumption of the executive responsibility by the king, the Maoists have succeeded to add a new dimension in their tactics of revolt. Now they have changed their political line and have come up with the policy of "victory through collaboration with competition " ie collaboration with the multi-party group, who are now deeply alienated from the king. The collaboration with the multi-party group implies working in tandem with the competitor fully aware that at the end of the day the strategic intent is to eliminate the competition itself, which means to eliminate both the king and the political parties who profess to their faith in parliamentary system. In lack of a far-sighted vision, the political parties have concentrated most of their efforts and political resources on the short-term goal of gaining power with or without the help of the king. The political parties have assumed naively that the Maoist cannot harm parliamentary system. Even now the parliamentary parties do not seem to grasp the strategic intent of the Maoists, which remains the overthrowing of the parliamentary system. Underestimating the latter has led to this collaboration. The implicit hope among the political parties is that the military strength of the Maoists will be an additional instrument for acquiring power even though they ideologically do not agree with their political ideology. The Maoists know this weakness and are eager to exploit it to the hilt The new layers of advantage that the Maoist now hope to generate from this collaboration is international legitimacy and the use of the political leverage of the political parties against multi- party system and the king. The UML, or at least the majority of its top leaders, seems to have decided to turn a deaf ear to this new development and may in fact be in the process of surrendering to the Maoists either consciously or unconsciously. On the other hand, the Nepali Congress, if the statements of some of its influential leaders are to be believed, has sensed this new peril and seems to be looking for an honorable way out of the quagmire. The success of the Maoists' present tactics of "victory through collaboration with competition" could be successful in establishing new layers of advantage for the creation of a Maoist state, ironically at the very cost of competition and the political parties. However, much would also depend upon the response of the ruling establishment now headed by the king himself. It is high time that the government should stop underestimating the Maoists. It should show its willingness to consolidate its strength by defining common space with the political parties even if that would require the government to postpone the proposed municipal election for the present. The government should also learn from the Maoist that flexibility does not mean surrender or is not a sign of weakness as long as its strategic intent is clear. (The writer is the co-chairman of the Rastriya Janasakti Party)