Marriage is an interesting subject to ponder about. Because it is so full of strategic behavior, understanding it can be very difficult but trying to understand it provides us with a lot of intuition on this tradition in Nepal. So, one day, during a coffee break in a KTM cafe, I pored over it, and jutted down some of my thoughts. Why not share it with fellow Sajhaites? 1.Mostly, husbands are older than wives. Since our population growth is positive, this means there are more eligible wives than husbands in the market, and hence the husbands are scarce commodities. 2. Suppose the quality of husband is uniformly distributed in [0,1] intervals. 0 denotes worthless husband, and one is the most eligible bachelor. Quality of women is also distributed similarly. Conventionally, men chose the women of quality index less than them. Assume the desirable difference as five percentage (this number pulled out of thin air). Then, the most eligible women (those above ninety five percentile) and least eligible men are likely to be unmarried. 3. Women's quality is more negatively correlated with their age than that of men. So, assuming optimum age of marriage for men is less than or equal to 30, and of women to be 25, therefore, women in top echelon are likely to be married in 25-30 years age span, if they are married at all. 4. Existence of dowry: Since from (1) above, at any point in the time there are more eligible women than men, men are more precious commodities and they command "dowry", i.e. to consume them, women (or their relative) have to pay. 5. Dowry is also proportionately related to the quality index: women at the lower index are likely to pay higher for men at the higher quality index. 6. However, if search cost of men is high, then women may pay high dowry for people whose quality is lower primarily because they don't know they could get better husband by paying similar amount of dowry(money). In Nepal, where is there is no organized matchmaking database, search cost is substantially high for women, and this results in higher rate of mismatch than in a free market with complete information would have resulted. 7. (Having a child) A combination of risk averse husband and wife is likely to beget children quicker than that of risk neutrals or risk averse. This is because they value stability high, and do not want to go out to the market looking for better options. By having children, they reduce their marriage quality index substantially, and make themselves undesirable in the market. 8. (Remarriage) Often, marrying once substantially reduce the quality index fo both groom and bride. This reduction is steeper for people at low quality index than those of high quality index. Remarriage is therefore likely to provide a spouse of considerable lower quality than the first one. 10. (Divorce of a spouse) A husband divorces a wife when he thinks total benefit of the wife for the rest of his life is less than total cost of staying with her conditional on the choices available to him. 11.(Murder) Murder is committed if divorce is not easy, and condition for (10) holds. In jest. With no pretention of science.