The question is not about what's written on PDF, it's about the relevance of proxy usage within CISPA's scope, and technical complications associated with guarding against anonymizing methods.

"If CISPA is to enforce at it's current form, consider TOR and any other anonymous services dead. This is just one aspect of what CISPA can do."

@bittertruth: You didn't write the PDF -- so you trying to justify its intent is useless. None of us here knows how far this can, or will go!

I challenge you to technically walk me through steps on how you can 'kill' one of the simplest forms of anonymizer. Forget Tor, I'll give you an easy scenario:

How do you police and prevent an attacker (A) from pwn'ing a victim (V)'s system, and spoofing his identity through proxying activities via V's machine; all within the Internet jumble (ie., you don't know who the victim will be, and don't know who the attacker is)?

Note: We're not looking for a detective measure here -- we're after proactive protection. Neither Tor, nor any other anonymizer out there can provide 'total' protection against tracebacks, so detection is possible; but based on your above claim -- CISPA's job (who's hat you're wearing now) here is to STOP that from happening! 

If you don't know the answer, feel free to deviate the topic and add more garbage -- I'll simply ignore your updates.

If you do, and can technically justify it, I'll come back here and acknowledge.

~@~