Heading off Ankara's nuclear temptation Jon B. Wolfsthal and Jessica C. Varnum International Herald Tribune THURSDAY, AUGUST 10, 2006 WASHINGTON Nothing good can come from a nuclear- armed Iran. But in case the international community needs additional motivation to head off Tehran's nuclear ambitions, states should consider that a nuclear Iran might cause Turkey - whose incentives to go nuclear have been steadily mounting - to pursue a nuclear option of its own. As a NATO ally, prospective member of the European Union and secular bridge to the Islamic world, Turkey is a much-needed and increasingly rare source of stability for the region and the global nonproliferation regime. Should the Turkish domino be overturned by a nuclear Iran, it could take other states with it - including Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, with unpredictable consequences It is not by chance that Turkey has no nuclear weapons. Great diplomatic efforts were made in the 1960s and 1970s to dissuade it from obtaining them. Turkey's ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1980 - a decade after it was completed - was largely predicated on NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Embedded in the global nonproliferation regime ever since, Turkey is able to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology and there are no suspicions, let alone evidence, that Turkey has violated any of its nonproliferation commitments. Turkey's security situation is changing rapidly, however. The fighting in Lebanon could spill over at any time. Kurdish separatists, emboldened by the situation in Iraq, threaten Turkey's territorial integrity. General unrest in Iraq and the unpredictability of Syrian policy put Turkish leaders on edge. Adding a nuclear Iran to this equation - with missiles capable of targeting all of Turkey - makes it obvious why even optimists wonder about Turkey's ultimate nuclear direction. When the Cold War ended, so too did Turkey's absolute confidence in NATO's security commitment. Fortunately, Ankara has responded to growing uncertainties by seeking further integration with the West. Yet even as Turkey's neighborhood becomes more dangerous and its strategic value to the West increases, it is the oft-neglected partner. U.S.-Turkish relations remain cool in the aftermath of Turkey's 2003 refusal to allow the transit of U.S. troops into Iraq. The increase in terrorism against Turkey by the Iraq-based Kurdistan Workers Party, along with the perception that the United States is doing too little to stop it, have further exacerbated tensions. Meanwhile, the EU continues to hedge on Turkish membership, and even the current Turkish government's strong commitment to the EU accession process is beginning to waver. Amid these uncertainties, a nuclear Iran might be too much for Turkey's leaders to process, and might push them to the nuclear edge. That Turkey recently decided to invest $1 billion in missile defense is a reminder of its real and growing concerns about Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Beyond preventing Iran from proliferating, the best hope of keeping Turkey non-nuclear is to convince its leaders that the West remains fully committed to its security. The EU must convince Turkey that the sacrifices it continues to make toward the goal of accession are not in vain, the United States should be more attentive to Turkey's concerns about Iraq, and NATO should recommit itself to the ultimate preservation of Turkey's security. Evaluating Turkey's worsening security situation, one inevitably concludes that its policy makers cannot help but keep the nuclear option in reserve, even while remaining committed to nonproliferation. The West must therefore be willing to undertake policies that will strengthen the position of Turkish leaders trying to hold the nonproliferation line by alleviating the threats Turkey faces. If we deal now with the root causes of Turkey's incentives to obtain nuclear weapons, we may still be able to avert a major crisis. (Jon B. Wolfsthal is a nonproliferation fellow and Jessica C. Varnum is an Armstrong Leadership intern at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.)