Please see my post from 2/24/2005 [I wrote it under gaule_kancha nickname], "PLAYING THE CHINA CARD - WHAT'S INDIA GOING TO DO?" . There I argued that Feb 1 move by King G put the political and security establishments in New Delhi in a big dilemma. The Indian government's knee-jerk reaction was to condemn the bloodless coup, withdraw its ambassador, demand that the King restore multi-party system, and suspend military aid. But not all foreign policy wonks in New Delhi were in agreement with that policy. Some thought that Indian government should have used a less confrontational rhetoric in order to avoid being "put in a box" [very true in retrospect] while others argued that India should actively support the King in order to defeat the Maoists, the supposedly common security threat. I used the word "supposedly" because we know that India was complicit in the rise of the Maoists in the late 1990s, much like it had a role in the rise of the LTTE in the early 1980s and Ariel Sharon had a role in the rise of the Hamas in the mid-1980s. Case in point, in 2003, Shyam Sharan, then Indian ambassador to Nepal and now the secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, denied India harboring Maoists when Nepali media were publishing reports about Madhav Nepal meeting Prachanda in Lukhnow. Given this weekend?s U-turn in Indian policy vis-a-vis Nepal and Natwar Singh's announcement that the resumption of military aid to RNA was "unconditional" observers are scratching their heads and saying "what the heck is going on here." My guess is that King G understood India better than India understood King G. As I said in my earlier post, immediately prior and just after the coup, King G actively played the China card. Later he expanded to include Pakistan to India's horror. India remained aloof while Chinese foreign minister and Pakistan PM visited Nepal, and Pakistan and Nepal "upgraded" their economic cooperation. India probably realized that it was losing leverage over Nepal faster than it could handle. In the olden days, India would probably taken dramatic actions like sanction (Nepal - 1990) or intervention (East Pakistan - 1970) but we live in a different world today, and moreover, Sheriff Bush would not allow that. India's only option was to work with the powerbrokers of Kathmandu. Sure, India would have preferred Congress party in Singha Durbar - "who needs Sadhbhawana when you have Congrees" - but given the impotence of Congress to advance its causes through street protests, India probably felt that it needed to cut its loses now before it was too late. King G may have promised something to Manmohan Singh as a face saving device, much like he promised Americans to hold local election as a step towards full-democracy, a classic Musharaff tactics [remember, the King made that announcement couple of days after the American ambassador left Nepal for "consultation" and media speculated that Americans had given the King a week's deadline to take concrete steps to restore democracy]. This U-turn in Indian policy is A VERY HUGE DEAL because India is the only country in the world than can actually impact events in Nepal - mainly because of its geography. This change of heart of the giant neighbor is a big boost to the current regime, and will help consolidate the power of the King - forget the 3 years of direct rule; it?s time to prepare for 30+ years. King G has shrewdly outmaneuvered both his domestic and international opponents. The only way to reverse the country?s slide towards the medieval social and political order is for strong internal opposition, but NOT the Maoists kind. That is not going to happen until Girija, Deuba and Nepal, and their cohorts are banished to Banarashi and fresh face come to lead the opposition parties. Which sane Nepali is going to shed blood again on the streets of Kathmandu to bring those guys to power? Ironically, the Maoists have become emboldened since Feb 1. They say, this is the last stage of their war. I don?t think Maoists have the capacity to run over the country - they have yet to capture and hold onto a district headquarter. At the same time, I also don?t believe news coming from RNA?s propaganda department. The RNA, with less than 100,000 troops, and more than 35% of that based in Kathmandu and another 50% concentrated in towns and cities and just a token of batallions in villages cannot win this war. All the reports about victories in this district, in that district are just made-up stories. I come from a village in western Nepal and I know the situation there through my conversations with those who have been there - things have gotten worse not better since Feb 1. Most likely, this conflict is going to take an ugly turn. The increasingly bloody and brutal war been the King?s army and Prachanda?s army will squeeze the moderate elements in Nepali society, and force them to chose between them. I think that will be the greatest tragedy of all.